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Vitor Blotta
1, São Paulo / Brazil 
 
The Fascination of Authority and the Authority of Fascination 
Rationalization and Legal Theory in Habermas Revised 
 
Abstract: The requalification of Habermas’ discussions on political philosophy and legal theory after 
the publication of Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion (2005), and his most recent texts and debates 
on religion and the public sphere, suggest a revision of the Habermasian theory of rationalization as it 
was firstly presented in Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (1982), especially on what concerns 
the  processes  of  dessacralization  and  the  linguistification  of  religious  authority.  In  search  of 
contributing  to  this  revision,  this  paper  intends  to  focus  on  the  problem  of  a  supposedly  “lost” 
aesthetic-expressive  understanding  of  religious  authority  in  Habermas’s  theory  of  rationalization, 
which may have contributed to a theory of law in Faktizität und Geltung (1992) that does not give 
satisfactory  account  to the  aesthetical-expressive  character  of  the  modern  understanding  of legal 
authority. A better understanding of this special character, however, may contribute not only to the 
avoidance of fundamentalisms and new attempts of “aesthetization of politics”, but also to a rational 
strengthening of the solidarity of the citizens of democratic constitutional states. 
Keywords:  religious  authority,  theory  of  rationalization,  fascination,  communicative  aesthetic 
rationality, legal authority 
 
Introduction 
This  paper  follows  attempts  of  qualifying  the  impacts  of  Jürgen  Habermas’  most  recent 
debates on religion and the public sphere on the modern understanding of legal authority.
2 
During the period around the publication of  Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion (2005), 
several  of  the  author’s  essays,  book  chapters,  conferences  and  critical  exchanges  were 
destined to revise the new influence of religious worldviews in the public sphere and their 
interplay with the “secular” language of public and political discourses.
3  
                                                           
1 Vitor Souza Lima Blotta. PhD candidate in Philosophy of Law at the University of São Paulo Law School; 
Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Violence (NEV/USP); scholarship from the Research Aid Foundation 
of the State of São Paulo (FAPESP - proc. 2008/08726-2); e-mail: vitor.blotta@uol.com.br. 
2 This study results from participation in the Seminar “Heiligkeit des Recht und Recht der Heiligkeit”, promoted 
by Prof. Dr. Klaus Günther and Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Schmidt at the Law School the J. W. Goethe University, 
Frankfurt am Main, in the summer semester of 2010. The seminar had the overall objective to re-examine, with 
influence of Habermas’ recent debates and studies on secularization in The Theory of Communicative Action, as 
well as many other philosophy of law studies, the relations between religion and the validity claim 
(Geltungsanspruch des Recht) of modern law. I thank Professor Klaus Günther for the comments and very 
thoughtful insights which helped me to work my way through the intricate theme of this paper.  
3 See Habermas, Faith and Knowledge. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15 October 2001; Habermas & Ratzinger, 
Dialektik der Sekularisierung, 2005; Habermas. “Again Religion and the Public Sphere: a Response to Paolo 
Flores d'Arcais”. Published in The Utopian. Feb. 14
th, 2009 (available at: http://www.the-2 
Even though these discussions raise problems to the pluralism claims of constitutional 
States
4, this study focuses on the revisions of Habermas’ account of the secularization process 
they also suggest, and their effects on his theory of law and democracy. 
It  will  be  argued  that  the  most  important  of  these  effects  is  the  possibility  of 
reconstructing  the  aesthetical  and  the  expressive  cores  of  modern  legal  authority,  which 
would have been somehow “lost” within Habermas’ theory of rationalization, and maybe for 
that reason not faced as a problem in Between Facts and Norms. 
The argument will start with the aim to prove that Habermas’ new works and debates on 
the new influence of religion in politics and the public sphere represent a requalification of 
his  political  philosophy  and  legal  theory  reflections,  suggesting  as  well  a  revision  of  his 
theory of modernity as a theory of rationalization (I).    
In  a  second  moment  (II),  a  comparison  between  Habermas’  view  on  religious  and 
traditional authorities and modern legal authority in Between Facts and Norms (1996) and in 
The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA, 1984-II:49), will highlight his use of the term 
“fascination” (Faszinosum), or “fascinating authority” (faszinierenden Autorität), as a way of 
distinguishing between traditional and modern authorities, or even as a criteria for identifying 
“modern” communicative actions as being freer than “traditional” ones (1992:41).  
Moreover,  if  practical  and  cognitive  rationalities  are  to  be  later  on  institutionalized 
respectively in the moral sanctions of natural law and in the instrumental sanctions of positive 
law, the absence of an analysis on how the aesthetic and the expressive characters of religious 
or traditional authorities influence the authority of modern law, motivates the last part of the 
paper  (III)  to  set  the  grounds  for  a  possible  reconstruction  of  the  “lost”  aesthetic  and 
expressive cores of the modern understanding of law. 
 
I. 
Chapters II and IV of Between Naturalism and Religion (BNR, Habermas, 2007:115-168 and 
279-392),  respectively  entitled  “Religious  Pluralism  and  Solidarity  of  the  Citizens  of  the 
State”, and “Religious Tolerance as predecessor of cultural rights” mark the beginning of a 
new phase in Habermas’ political and legal theories.  
An analysis of both chapters shows that the basic premises of the discursive theory of 
law and democracy are not refuted, but complemented and enhanced, when Habermas faces 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
utopian.org/2009/02/000063.html. last access: 20/09/2010); and the forthcoming Mandieta and Van Antwerpen 
(eds), The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, Columbia University Press (February 2011), which has a 
review available at: http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-15645-5/the-power-of-religion-in-the-public-sphere 
(last access: 21/09/2010). 
4 See Habermas, 2007:115-168 e 279-347. 3 
the problem of the pre-political bases of the democratic constitutional states, such as religious 
worldviews, which have come to play a strong influence in recent national and international 
political scenarios.
5  
In the essay on chapter II, “Pre-political bases of the democratic state”
6, this discussion 
begins by raising again the Böckenförde dilemma, formulated in 1976: a free and secularized 
State  lives  on  presuppositions  that  itself  cannot  guarantee.
7  Despite arguing against this 
statement, and defending that a post-positivist interpretation of the democratic procedure does 
not suffer  from  a  “validity  deficit”  to  be  filled  by  an  ethical  substance  (Id.op.cit:118), 
Habermas  comes  to  consider  normatively  that  the  state  should  also  protect  the  “cultural 
sources” on which it rests its ultimate integration potentials, namely, the “consciousness of 
norms and the solidarity of the citizens” (Id.op.cit:126).  
Further in BNR, in the text “Religious Tolerance as predecessor of cultural rights” (cap. 
IV, ps. 279-300), the connection the new influence of religion in politics and the theory of law 
becomes  clearer,  when  Habermas  suggests  that  cultural  rights  -  such  as  rights  to  self-
representation and public recognition of determined religious or other cultural minorities in 
the public sphere - should widen the intersubjective interpretation of the legal concept subject 
of rights to an extent that socialized individuals can “form and stabilize their identity in the 
interior of a network of reciprocal recognition relations” (Id.op.cit:298-299).  
This means that Habermas is not only worried anymore with how modern law should 
consider the “intersubjective nature of the political opinion and will formation processes” (Id., 
1999:116), one of the greatest challenges of Between Facts and Norms, but also that the rights 
which protect the integrity of the individuals have to amplified “to the point that they can 
guarantee  access  to  the  contexts  of  experience,  communication  and  recognition  through 
which a person can articulate a comprehension of him or herself, as well as develop and 
maintain a singular identity” (Id., 2007:299)
8. 
                                                           
5 Habermas gives as example of this new influence of religion in politics the rise of the fundamentalisms in the 
eastern world, the striving for the European countries to administer the cultural clashes between different 
religions and worldviews of co-citizens and migrants, or the religious core of the republicanism in the EUA, 
which helped the reelection of G. W. Bush despite the general knowledge of the falsely alleged existence of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraqi, and its connections with Al Qaeda (Habermas, 2007:129-134). 
6 Introduction to a discussion with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger on January 19, 2004, originally published in 
Information Philosophie, Oct, 2004, pp. 7-15. Published as well in Habermas & Ratzinger (2005). 
7 “Der freiheitliche, säkularisierte Staat lebt von Voraussetzungen, die er selbst nicht garantieren kann. Das ist 
das große Wagnis, das er, um der Freiheit willen, eingegangen ist. Als freiheitlicher Staat kann er einerseits nur 
bestehen, wenn sich die Freiheit, die er seinen Bürgern gewährt, von innen her, aus der moralischen Substanz des 
einzelnen und der Homogenität der Gesellschaft, reguliert“. Böckenförde, 1976, p. 60. Highlights not from the 
original. 
8 Free translation from Brazilian version. Italic not from the original. 4 
This  shift  on  the  concern  of  Habermas’  theory  of  law  from  proceduralizing  and 
institutionalizing  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  to  assuring  the  enabling  conditions  for 
processes of individuation through socialization, can be seen as part of his recent movement 
towards developing a concept of human dignity that would be simultaneously crossed by both 
individual and political autonomies
9 (Id, 2009; 2009a). It can be interpreted as well as a more 
immanent incorporation of elements of Axel Honneth’s social theory of recognition, such as 
in the use of the term recognition politics (Id., 2007:299). The term was present only in the 
feminist movement discussion in Between Facts and Norms (1996:409-426), but not on the 
theoretical elaboration of the “legal form” (Id.op.cit:122-123) or the principle of democracy 
(Id.op.cit:127). 
The need for a new account of the theory secularization is also one of the effects of this 
new shift in Habermas’ theory of law, but it seems now to be only faced from “the outside”, 
that is, in political and legal perspectives. In order to properly address this problem, however, 
one  would  have  to  endow  the  extraordinary  effort  of  revisiting  the  whole  theory  of 
rationalization  in  TCA,  because  a  revision  of  the  theory  o  secularization  is,  above  all,  a 
problem of the status of modern rationality, 
For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  however,  only  a  small  part  of  this  endeavor  will  be 
attempted, having as focus the problem of how Habermas works the rationalization of the 
fascinating character of religious authority in topics 2 and 3 of chapter V of TCA, and in 
which sense they led the absence of an aesthetical and expressive account of legal authority in 
Between Facts and Norms.  
As will be argued in the last section, the connection between the need for this “step-
back” reflection and the questions raised by this new shift in Habermas’ theory of law can 
contribute to a post-metaphysic account of the aesthetical and expressive characters of legal 
authority,  justifying  the  need  for  law  to  incorporate  immanently  claims  of  individuation 
through socialization present in political public spheres.  
Moreover,  this  could  be  a  way  of  allowing  aesthetical  and  affective  aspects  of 
communication  and  experience  contribute  “post-metaphysically”  to  the  motivation  of  the 
“sources of the solidarity” and the “consciousness of the norms” that both the legitimacy of 
law and social integration still depend upon.   
                                                           
9 “...given that the liberal state depends on a political integration of the citizens, one that cannot reduce itself in a 
simple modus vivendi, this differentiation of the modes of belonging [to a nation state or a religious community] 
cannot limit itself as a mere adaptation – absent from cognitive claims – from the religious ethos to laws 
imposed by secular society. On the contrary, the universalist legal order and the egalitarian morals of society 
have to be connected, from the inside, to the ethos of the community, in such a way that one thing can emerge 
consistently from the other.” Habermas, 2007:127 (Highlights from the original. Free translation from Brazilian 
version).  5 
II. 
At  first,  Habermas  suggests  that  one  should  deal  with  the  problems  raised  by  the  new 
influence of religion in the public sphere “less dramatically”, by leaving it an open “empirical 
question”  for  communicative  rationality,  or  a  “cognitive  challenge”.  He  does  not  deny, 
however, that the problem has also come to make philosophy and politics rethink the basis of 
secularization as a progressive and linear rationalization process (Habermas, 2007:121-128). 
This becomes clear with following reflection in BNR: 
 
“Once  accepted  the  experience  of  a  secularizing  birth  of  potentials  of  meaning  that  were 
encapsulated, it is possible to attribute to the Böckenförde theorem a less captious sense. (…) In 
the post-secular society, it is imposed the idea that the ‘modernization of public consciousness’ 
encompasses,  in  different  phases,  both  religious  and  profane  mentalities,  transforming  them 
reflexively.  In  this  case, both  sides  can,  when  understand, in  common,  the  secularization  of 
society  as  a  process  of  complementary  learning,  take  seriously,  for  cognitive  reasons,  their 
contributions to controversial themes in the public sphere.” (Id.op.cit:126. First italic from us. 
Second italic from the original. Free translation from Brazilian version).  
   
The importance of this revision of the theory of rationalization can be as well proved by 
the attention that Habermas gives to the theme in two of his most recent texts, published by 
the first time in the last of the five volumes of his Studienausgabe, organized by Suhrkamp 
Press  in  celebration  of  his  80
th  birthday.  Especially  on  the  text  “Die  Revitalisierung  der 
Weltreligionen – Herausforderung für ein säkulares Selbstverständnis der Moderne?” 
10, these 
questions are raised as problems for Weber’s and Durkheim’s rationalization theories, which 
influenced  Habermas’  own  in  TCA,  as  well  as  for  the  fundaments  of  political  justice 
(Id.op.cit:399-403). 
Further  in  the  same  volume,  on  the  seventy-page  long  “Von  den  Weltbildern  zur 
Lebenswelt”
11,  Habermas  describes  the  modern  differentiation  of  rationality  and  settles 
religion on the side of art, following science and morals or law (Habermas, 2009a:204). But 
despite not giving a deeper theoretical elaboration on the relation between the first two, this is 
a sign that maybe for the author religion has come to share with art the status of world images 
or  worldviews  of  the  lifeworld  that  can  be  seen  as  objectifications  of  aesthetical  and 
expressive rationalities. 
                                                           
10 “The revitalization of World Religions. Challenges for a secular self-understanding of the modern? Free 
translation in. Id. 2009a:387-407. 
11 From the world images to the lifeworld”. Free translation from German original. 6 
Following  the  threads  of  these  debates,  this  section  will  first  concentrate  on  how 
Habermas describes the authority of religious and traditional societies in comparison with 
modern institutions in Faktizität und Geltung (FG, 1992). This description will then demand a 
revision of a related discussion in the topics 2 and 3 of chapter V of TCA, when the processes 
of dessacralization of religious authority and linguistification of religious worldviews were 
analyzed, with basis on Durkheim’s sociology of religion and Mead’s theory of symbolically 
mediated interaction.  
This analysis aims to prove that for Habermas the fascinating character of “pre-modern” 
forms  of  domination  seems  to  be  somewhat  “dissolved”  in  his  account  of  the  modern 
rationalization process, and that this would mean, despite the growing risks of dissent and 
disintegration,  an  irrefutable  gain  of  autonomy  for  individuals  of  complex  societies 
(Habermas, 1996:27).  
If this impression is correct, first of all, Habermas would have difficulties to explain the 
masses’ legitimation and acceptance of the authoritarisms of the first half of the 20
th century. 
This was one of the great concerns of the first generation of critical theory. In the well-known 
essay “The work of art in the age of its technical reproducibility” (1934-36), for example, 
Walter Benjamin highlighted how national socialism was organized upon an “aesthetization 
of politics”
12, and in Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947), Adorno and Horkheimer suggested how 
anti-semitism and fascism fed upon the remains of religious hate and intolerance that hid 
behind its operational forms.
13 
In a second moment, this supposed “dissolution” of the fascinating form of religious 
authority in Habermas’ theory of rationalization, would then reflect in his most recent studies 
on the new power of religion in the public sphere and on the discursive theory of law. The 
new question that arises can be put in the following terms: can a “post-secular” society, or a 
“post-metaphysical”  rationality  afford  to  dismiss,  in  its  present  stage  of  reflexivity,  a 
problematization of the fascinating character of religious or traditional authorities and its 
                                                           
12 See the foreword and the epilogue of Benjamin (1975:9 and 34). 
13 “It is very much improbable that the religious hostility that, during two millennia, impelled the persecution of 
the Jews has been entirely extinguished. Much on the contrary, the care with which anti-semitism renegades its 
religious tradition shows that it is still, even if as a secret, so profoundly deep-rooted in it, as if in another time 
the profane idiosyncrasy in the religious care. The religion has been integrated as cultural patrimony, but not 
abolished. The alliance between the enlightenment and domination impeded that its true part could have access 
to consciousness and conserved its reified forms. The two things come to benefit fascism: the uncontrolled 
nostalgia is canalized as a racist rebellion; the descendents of the visionary evangelists are converted, in the 
Wagnerian model of the Saint Grail knights, in conjured of the blood comfrey and in elite guards; religion as 
institution is, in part, confused in a direct and inextricable manner with the system and, in part, transposed in the 
show of the mass culture and the parades. The fanatic faith, from which vaingloried the chiefs and its followers, 
is no other than the ingrained  faith that helped, in another time, the desperate to bare, only its content has been 
lost. It continues to feed upon solely the hate for those who do not share the faith. (Adorno & Horkheimer, 
1985:164-165. Free translation from Portuguese version). 7 
relations to the present understanding of law? Habermas’ own words can give an answer to 
this question by posing another one, and hence justify the effort here to be attempted: 
 
“The Enlightenment's polemical relationship with the secular power of religion has obscured the 
fact  that  post-metaphysical  thinking  has  absorbed  content  from  the  Judeo-Christian  tradition 
which is no less important than the inheritance of Greek metaphysics. And are we sure that this 
process of discursive absorption of religious content has been concluded? Can post-metaphysical 
thinking exclude the possibility  that our religious inheritance might have semantic potentials 
which - when they offer profane truth contents - can develop an inspirational power for the whole 
of society?” (Habermas, “Again Religion and the Public Sphere”, 2009) 
    
1. The fascination of authority in Between Facts and Norms 
Given these preliminary reflections, the use of the word “fascination” in FG appears in the 
fourth topic of the second section of its first chapter (Habermas, 1992:39-41), when Habermas 
is comparing the leveling of the tension between facticity and validity of the modern lifeworld 
to that of what he calls “archaic” institutions of “tribal societies”. 
Even though both levelings consist on the non-problematization of shared interpretations 
of the world, norms and personal expressions which stabilize behavioral expectations, they 
would  maintain  an  important  distinction:  while  on  the  modern  lifeworld  the  non-
problematization occurs because the certainties that involve everyday communication have 
the  status  of  background  knowledge,  on  the  case  of  archaic  institutions,  this  absence  of 
problematization occurs because their authority exert such an imposing and mystic form of 
power  over  its  addresses  that  their  world  images,  values  and  expressions  fuse  in  a 
“crystallized syndrome”, to an extent that its validity becomes as evident as objectified facts. 
This complex form of power is what Habermas calls “fascination” (Faszinosum) (Habermas, 
1997-I:42-44). 
At first, the obstacles for the problematization of archaic institutions are for Habermas 
caused by the  ritualistic and ceremonial practices  in  which the narratives  and norms are 
pronounced  and  shared.  Secondly,  Habermas  retakes  part  of  Durkheim’s  sociology  of 
religion, which he more extensively analyzed in TCA (see next topic), to highlight how this 
authority provokes ambivalent feelings in the believers who contemplate images and objects 
that represents it. These feelings, a mixture of enthusiasm and fear, veneration and dread, 
attraction and repulse, can be considered the most important characteristics of the fascination 
exerted by this authority; that is to say, its contradictory meaning, which would “blind” de 8 
judgment and provoke an acceptance such of its validity that the “social sanctions” which 
follow its violation become only secondary to the respect it alone obtains (Id.op.cit:43-44). 
The fascinating character of religious authority has been also thoroughly described by the 
work of religion philosopher Rudolf Otto The Idea of the Holy: an inquiry into the non-
rational factor in the idea of the divine and its relation to the rational (1917), which tried to 
understand rationally the contradictory feelings of the religious experience, as an experience 
of the “numen”, or the “numinous”, in clear dialogue with Kantian idealism.
14 The well-
known  sentence  “mysterium  tremendous  et  fascinosum”  (“tremendous  and  fascinating 
mystery”) shows that fascination is here opposed to the “daunting” aspect of the numen, as a 
feeling  that  “captivates  and  transports  him  [the  one  who  “trembles  before  the  daemonic-
divine”, as earlier stated. V. B.] with a strange ravishment, rising often enough to the pitch of 
dizzy intoxication; it is the Dionysiac element in the numen.” (Otto, 1923:31).  
Aside from this binding and uncontrollable force of religious fascination, when Otto then 
relates it to its “profane” expressions, some connections with the expressive individuation 
claims of Honneth’s recognition theory, which Habermas seeks to incorporate in his theory of 
law, become clear:  
 
“The ideas and concepts which are the parallels or ‘schemata’ on the rational side of this non-
rational element of ‘fascination’ are Love, Mercy, Pity, Comfort; these are all ‘natural’ elements 
of the common psychical life, only they are here thought as absolute and in completeness. But 
important as those are for the experience of religious bliss of felicity, they do not by any means 
exhaust it. (…)  Bliss  or  beatitude  is  more,  far  more,  than the  mere  natural  feeling  of  being 
comforted, of reliance, of the joy of love, however these may be heightened and enhanced.” 
(1927:31-32. Our italics).
15 
   
Habermas  also  utilizes,  other  than  Faszinosum  and  faszinierenden  (respectively 
“fascination”  and  “fascinating”,  as  translated  to  English),  the  term  bannende,  which  is 
translated by “spellbinding” in the English version of FG (1996:24). Interestingly enough, the 
translation of the corresponding verb bannen to English means at the same time to avert and 
to ward off - or in “religious meaning”, to “ex-communicate”, as to exclude someone from a 
certain religious community or practice, or even “to exorcise” a ghost – and to captivate and 
                                                           
14 Otto discussed directly with Kant in The Philosophy Of Religion Based On Kant And Fries (1931), and had as 
well an interesting contribution to the debate between natural sciences and religion with Naturalism and Religion 
(1913). For access to these works, see. 
http://www.archive.org/search.php?query=creator%3A%22Rudolf+Otto%22 (last access: 26/09/2010.   
15 For more, see. Otto, R. 1923:31-41 (chapter “The Element of Fascination”). I thank Professor Klaus Günther 
for indicating this important reference to the study. 9 
to charm. Moreover, when the same verb is read in “artistic meaning”, it also means “to 
capture”, as to capture an image when painting on a canvas.
16 
It  is  maybe  for  no  other  reason  that  Habermas  then  relates  the  fascinating  and  thus 
contradictory  affective  experiences  of  these  archaic  authorities  to  the  ones  still  today 
produced by the aesthetic “shocks” of surrealism and other critical art forms, as worked by 
authors like Benjamin, Bataille or Leiris (Id. Ibid). Although only briefly cited in FG, this 
theme is analyzed by Habermas in the essay “Consciousness-raising or rescuing critique: the 
actuality of Walter Benjamin” (1975), as a possible critical use of an art that had lost its 
“aura” in modernity;
17 maybe the same way as social authority would have lost its fascinating 
character. 
What  becomes  clear,  thus,  is  that  despite  consisting  on  an  inebriating  attraction  that 
blocks  or  undermines  rationality  and  critique,  the  fascinating  character  of  archaic  and 
religious authority was the element responsible for enabling the necessary bonding relation 
for  societal  integration;  a  bond  grounded  on  a  validity  derived  from  contexts  of 
communicative action which, although dependant on this fascinating element, limited self-
interested action and dispensed instrumental external sanctions to be formed and stabilized. 
Nowadays, when the fascinating element of religious authority is read in more profane terms 
or analyzed in modern authorities, Habermas dislocates it from the religious to the symbolic 
domain of aesthetic and expressive experiences.
18 
As Habermas passes on to discuss the authority of modern law in  FG (topic 5, section 2 
of chapter I), however, he describes a process of complexification and differentiation in the 
passage of traditional to modern societies in which this fascinating element of archaic and 
religious authority, still present in medieval and absolutist law, gradually “fall apart”. And 
albeit  liberating  new  possibilities  for  rationality  and  action  oriented  towards  mutual 
understanding  and  rationality  and  action  towards  self-interested  goals,  in  an  ever  more 
pluralized lifeworld, only the now somewhat “weakened” first two would have the ability to 
maintain the sources of social integration (Habermas, 1996:25-26). 
                                                           
16 See this translation in the electronic English-German dictionary Dict.cc. at http://www.dict.cc/?s=bannen (last 
access: 21.09.2010). 
17 According to Duvenage (2003:22), this text is to date one of the most focused works of Habermas on 
aesthetics. This discussion will be retaken at section III. As will be seen in the next topic of the present section, 
Habermas also utilizes the concept of aura, with reference to Benjamin, to speak of the same phenomena of the 
fascination of authority in TCA. 
18 “Benjamin, not unlike theorists of political religion, argued that the loss of tradition and the decline of 
religious authority constituted critical elements in the "auraticization" of fascism. In contrast to those theorists, 
however, Benjamin added another crucial element to the understanding of fascism's approach to politics, an 
element that links fascism closely to the l'art pour l'art movement: the prevalence of form over ethical norms. It 
is the presence of this element, I will argue, that characterizes Italian fascism's aestheticized politics”; Falasca-
Zamponi (1997:10). 10 
This diagnosis of the times over which Habermas rests the first premises of the discursive 
theory of law and democracy
19, seem nonetheless now to be questioned by his new studies on 
the new influence of religion in the public sphere. The requalification of the theory of law that 
accompanies them are a clear sign of this questioning (see I).  
As  the  analysis  promotes  now  the  “step-back”  to  the  theses  of  rationalization  and 
linguistification of the sacred in TCA, a critique of the passage from a fascinating authority to 
a moral authority based on linguistic understanding and grammatical speech will enable one 
to perceive the “lost” core of the aesthetical and expressive authority in Habermas’ theory of 
rationalization, which can possibly contribute to a better understanding of the requalification 
he now searches for his theory of law.  
   
2. The fascination of authority in The Theory of Communicative Action 
The  second  topic  of  chapter  V  of  TCA,  intitled  “The  Authority  of  the  Sacred  and  the 
Normative  Background  of  Communicative  Action”,  presents  the  fascinating  character  of 
religious  authority in  a  dialog with  Durkheim’s analysis of the passage from  religious  to 
moral  authority.  Habermas’  general  intention  with  this  (and  the  following)  topic  is  to 
understand what kind of normatively guided interaction substitutes religious authority in the 
role of providing the social bonds, and thus, the integrative forces of modern societies. 
After demonstrating how Mead’s theory of symbolically mediated interaction lacks a 
reflection on the formation of a social authority that is not based on the possibility of sanction 
of  the  “generalized  other”,  but  on  the  sense  of  validity  of  reciprocally  attributed  norms 
(Habermas, 1987-II:64-69), Habermas’ seeks then in Durkheim’s theory of religion the pre-
linguistic background of norm consciousness that formed the structures of an intersubjectivity 
whose integrating forces were present in the complex character of the norm’s authority. 
In  the  discussion  on  the  concepts  of  duty  and  inclination  in  Kant’s  moral  theory, 
Durkheim  discusses  the  ritualistic  and  therefore  “impersonal  power  of  the  sacred  which 
reaches beyond all that is merely individual.” After that, Habermas continues in addend “b” of 
the  topic,  showing  clearly  the  relation  between  the  fascination  and  the  aura  of  sacred 
authority: 
 
“Further, the sacred arouses the same ambivalent attitude as moral authority, for it is surrounded 
with an aura that simultaneously frightens and attracts, terrorizes and enchants: ‘The sacred being 
                                                           
19 The very clear premises are: “The actors themselves to come to some understanding about the normative 
regulation of strategic interactions. (…) According to the above analysis, the type of norms required would have 
to bring about willingness to comply simultaneously by means of de facto constraint and legitimate validity.” 
(Habermas, 1996:26-27 italics from the original). 11 
is in a sense forbidden; it is a being which may not be violated; it is also good, loved and sought 
after’ (citing Durkheim. “Determination of Moral Facts. In. Durkheim, 1974:70). In the aura 
itself is expressed the untouchability of what is at the same time sought after, the closeness in the 
distance.(…) The sacred produces and stabilizes just the ambivalence that is characteristic of the 
feeling of moral obligation.” (Id. 1984-II:49). 
 
The search of Durkheim’s sociology of religion to understand the symbolic background 
of modern morality is what gives Habermas the link from symbolically mediated interaction 
to grammatical speech acts, as an abstraction of content from the interpretative moment of 
religious  understandings,  to  what  would  still  stand  as  a  possible  medium  of  solidarity  in 
profane communication: performative language (Id.op.cit:50-57) 
Even though criticizing Durkheim’s concept of collective consciousness as an overly 
uniform impersonal power “writ large”, and therefore excessively linked to a philosophy of 
the subject approach, Habermas agrees that it is possible for interpretative understandings of 
the  world  and  norms  to  stabilize  and  steer  processes  of  individuation  through  cultic 
socialization  practices.  This  tension  between  personality  and  intersubjectivity,  which 
originates from the ambivalent feelings of a fascinating authority and is revealed through 
symbolic individual expressions, would have remained inside moral dilemmas, and further, in 
the  ever  more  “instable”  expressions  of  differentiated  structures  of  grammatical  speech 
(Id.op.cit:57-62). 
It is then that Habermas makes the bridge to discuss the “three roots of communicative 
action”, in a formal-pragmatic description of speech acts and already also “in the horizon of a 
modern  understanding  of  the  world”.  The  “dissolution”  of  the  fascination  of  religious 
authority and its concentration on practical discourse is initiated with this reasoning: 
 
“The inter-relation between collective consciousness, on the one side, and, on the other side, 
norms that can be applied to specific situations and personality structures that can be attributed to 
individuals, remains unclear as long as the structure of reaching understanding in language has 
not been cleared up. Religious symbolism represents one of three prelinguistic [in the sense of 
propositionally  differentiated  language]  roots  of  communicative  action.  Only  in  and  through 
communicative  action  can  the  energies  of  social  solidarity  attached  to  religious  symbolism 
branch out and be imparted, in the form of moral authority, both to institutions and to persons.” 
(Habermas, 1984-II:61. Highlights from us). 
   12 
The excursus on the three roots of communicative action promotes a reflection of the 
relations  between  forms  of  speech  acts  such  as  the  assertoric,  regulative  or  expressive 
utterances. It becomes clear, however, that the characteristics of sacred authority have been 
translated only to moral authority, leaving its world-disclosing and expressive functions out 
of the differentiation of rationality into grammatical speech acts (Id.op.cit:62-64).  
The  assertoric  sentences  mingle  with  regulative  sentences,  and  the  same  way  with 
expressive speech.  Truth, justice and sincerity claims can be expressed with each others’ 
speech acts. The content of the sacred character of authority, however, where rested the strong 
element of the fascination of authority once fundamental to actions towards binding with 
social norms, does not influence the expressions and attitudes towards the description of the 
external world and the possibility of its falseness, and the expression of the internal world and 
the eventuality of its insincerity or non-authenticity in performative speech acts (Id.op.cit:65-
70). 
This clear concentration of the sacred character of authority only to moral action, and the 
reduction of constative and expressive actions respectively to experiences of objects or events 
and confessions of personal experiences, are then led to another discussion on the influence of 
religion in truth claims in Durkheim.  
With the substitution of the concept of collective consciousness for grammatical speech 
and the reconstruction of its three unavoidable performative validity claims, Habermas relates 
one to another. He privileges, however, the relations between truth and rightness, focusing 
expressive action more to sincerity than to authenticity (Id. 1984-II:70-71).  
The aesthetic aspect of communicative action, translated in “dramaturgical action” in the 
first volume of TCA (Id. 1984-I:90-94), can reach a public for Habermas, but it is dealt only 
as sensitive or “‘passionate’ action in Feuerbach’s sense”, like confessions or even a marriage 
(relation  to  regulative  action),  which  enables  intuitive  insights  and  raises  sincerity  and 
affective  claims.  It  seems  that  even  though  released  from  the  spell  of  fascination  which 
reduced  objectivating  and  expressive  experiences  to  the  practical  character  of  sacred 
authority, aside from their critical aspect, their possible illocutionary powers - especially of 
expressive and aesthetical action - are not yet sufficiently described. (Habermas, 1984-II70-
72): 
But if in the first part of the excursus the binding force of the fascinating aspect of 
archaic authority is not properly translated to constative and expressive attitudes towards the 
world, in the end, it is again discussed and possibly considered in relation to the function of 13 
influencing not only practical communication, but the perfomative, and thus, a self-reflective 
mode of communication in general: 
 
“From a genetic standpoint, the performative attitude can be understood, perhaps, as the result of 
a secularization and generalization of that emotionally ambivalent attitude toward sacred objects 
that  originally  secured  the  recognition  of  moral  authority.  This  transformation  becomes 
necessary to the degree that the illocutionary components of speech acts are released from their 
symbiotic  entanglement  with archaic institutions  and  are  differentiated so that  assertoric  and 
expressive sentences are also endowed with illocutionary forces, and in this way modalized and 
incorporated in communicative actions.” (Habermas, 1984-II: 75-76. Italics from us). 
 
In  the  end,  however,  practical  rationality  still  seems  to  have  a  certain  priority  over 
constative and expressive utterances, for it is linked to the accountability claim that every 
actor  raises  when  performing  communicative  action.  This  accountability  drives  one  to 
compare  and  change  the  three  “modes”  of  communication,  in  order  to  depict  from 
symbolically mediated interaction in general the underlying norms which should (or should 
not) guide social action. This attitude constitutes a self-reflection of the actor in relation to all 
three  roots  of  communicative  action  (Id.op.cit:76).  The  necessity  of  a  critique  not  only 
towards  claims  of  moral  authority  but  also  towards  constative  and  expressive  speech, 
however, could reveal their particular performative and thus illocutionary powers. 
 
3. The Rational Structure of the Linguistification of the Sacred 
The  following  topic  of  TCA  resumes  more  specifically  the  problem  of  how  the  social 
integrative forces of archaic and sacred authorities could be substituted by those derived from 
authority of achieved rational consensus in modernity
20. It is here that one can see precisely 
how  Habermas  relates  the  replacement  of  the  fascinating  aspect  of  authority  for  the 
“binding/bonding” power of criticizable validity claims as a liberation of the rational potential 
of communicative action, that is, as the possibility of a “freer” form of social interaction. This 
thesis is explained by an analysis of the development of the category of law in Durkheim’s 
The Division of Labor in Society (New York, 1933), and in the excursus on the problem of 
identity  and  the  pressure  of  individuation  claims  in  modernity  in  Mead’s  social  theory 
(Id.op.cit:77-78). 
                                                           
20 From the original version, the concept of aura can also be seen as the fascinating aspect of authority: “Die 
Aura des Entzückens und Enrschreckens, die von sakralen ausstrahlt, die bannende Kraft des Heiligen wird zur 
bindenden Kraft kritisierbarer Geltungsansprüche zugleich sublimiert und veralltäglicht (Habermas, 1981-II:119. 
Highlights from the original). 14 
Even though Habermas considers that both Durkheim and Weber saw the development of 
law as a process of disenchantment and generalization of sacred authority to one based on the 
“generality of the underlying interest” and the possibility of coercion, still, something of the 
sacred would have remained in the rational. The differentiation between criminal law (related 
to the ritualistic and “expiation” character of the sanction) and private civil law (related to the 
satisfaction  of  the  legitimate  interests  of  all  involved),  for  instance,  represented  a 
linguistification  process  of  sacred  authority.  They  both  presupposed,  however,  a  form  of 
morality that rested in the end in a discursive political will-formation, which kept the social 
integrative bond necessary for the general acceptance of the norm (Id.op.cit:78-82). 
This generalization process that leads sacred authority to a discursive morality as the new 
source  of  social  solidarity,  is  accompanied  as  well  by  a  “growing  individuation  of 
individuals”, studied by Durkheim as expressions of individualism, respect for personality, 
individual  dignity  etc.  These  individuation  processes,  from  which  the  aesthetical  and 
expressive aspects  of communicative action will be analyzed in  III, are not  seen only as 
“arbitrary free choice” among alternatives, but as “‘reflective self-understanding’”. Morality, 
law  and  individuation  take  on  in  modernity  respectively  the  functions  of  reaching 
understanding,  coordinating  action  and  socializing  individuals,  which  belonged  to  sacred 
authority in traditional societies (Id.op.cit:82-85). 
The unity of semantic social meaning once generated by religion as a form of cultural 
knowledge, a cultural tradition and a worldview, however, could only be recuperated in the 
unity of the illocutionary power of all three forms speech acts combined. This would mean, 
for Habermas, when he explicitly discusses for the last time in the topic the fascinating power 
of sacred authority, that 
 
“The structural aspects of the development of religious worldviews, which Durkheim and Weber 
sketched in complementary ways, can be explained by the fact that the validity basis of tradition 
shifts from ritual action to communicative action. Convictions owe their authority less and less to 
the spellbinding power and the aura of the holy, and more and more to a consensus that is not 
merely reproduced but achieved, that is, brought about communicatively” (Habermas, op.cit:89. 
Highlights from the original). 
  
But albeit religious worldviews differentiate out into all three specific claims of speech 
acts in modernity (Id.op.cit:88), as already discussed, their spellbinding power and the aura of 
authority that would be substituted by a communicatively achieved consensus have focus on 15 
the moral discourse. It is morality, and not science or art, who would have inherited religion’s 
“mantle”, that is, the role of maintaining social integration in modernity (Id.op.cit:88-92). 
For this reason, on what follows this topic in TCA, the dissolution of the spellbinding and 
auratic powers of religious and archaic authorities become evident, and it is possible to see 
how  they  reflect  on  the  discursive  demands  of  morals  and  legal  communication  as  the 
instrumentalization and enforcement of law. But if the fascination of authority has also effect 
on  the  formation  of  religious  worldviews  and  can  nowadays  be  felt  in  the  contradictory 
emotions  towards  critical  art  (Id,  1996:24),  its  connections  with  practical  utterances  are 
somewhat left aside as irrational relations to authority and law in modernity. 
The example of the marriage, used by Habermas to show how the expressive speech act 
“I do” is at the same time a moral contract and can also be seen as a ritualized manifestation 
of a worldview (Id.op.cit:69-70), is as far as the author goes in his attempt to indicate the 
residual auratic core of a norm that has the form of an expressive utterance. On the other 
hand, the political public sphere, parliaments and courts, where the political will formation 
and decision making occur, are not seen as spaces where ritualized practices take place, and 
this suggests that they would not be influenced by that “archaic” spellbinding power.   
In sections “C” and “E” of the topic, Habermas focuses on Mead’s individuation theory, 
which can be generally summed as the socialization of individuals and the reciprocal “role-
taking”  practices  that  would  occur  through  the  use  of  the  personal  pronouns  “I”  (more 
authentic  “ego-identity”)  and  “me”  (more  socialized  expression  of  ego-identity).  This 
approach to communicative socialization enables one to visualize the inevitable projection of 
an  ideal  “communication  community”,  revealed  in  the  accountability  claims  that  each 
individual raises to each other in everyday communication.
21  
Still, the claims of  self-determination,  self-realization  and  autonomy  that  also  derive 
from these socialization processes are seen more as a possible critique of Kantian philosophy 
of consciousness with focus on the categorical imperative, than as to identify the heuristic 
potentials of its negative manifestations, such as expressions and verbalizations of injustice 
and discrimination experiences in the political public sphere (Id.op.cit:92-94).  
The only time this type of analysis is implicitly mentioned, is when Habermas considers 
that: 
 
                                                           
21 “The structure of linguistic intersubjectivity which finds expression in the system of personal pronouns 
ensures that the child learns to play social roles in the first person. This structural pressure blocks the simple 
reduplication of group identity in the personality structure of the individual; it works as a pressure toward 
individuation.” (Habermas, 1984-II:90). 16 
“The universality of a moral norm can be a criterion of its validity only if by this is meant that 
universal norms express in a reasonable way the common will of all involved. This condition is 
not met merely be norms taking on the grammatical form of universal ought-sentences; immoral 
maxims,  or  maxims  without  any  moral  content,  can  also  be  formulated  in  this  way.” 
(Id.op.cit:94). 
 
This  relates  to  an  idea  of  a  “negative  morality”,  and  the  empirical  concept  of  real 
communication community, with which the ideal community contrasts in social philosophy 
analyses.
22 The identity politics of ethnic groups are also mentioned as example of this type of 
individuation through socialization claims. As will be discussed on the second part of section 
III, these concepts could specially open venue for a discussion of the conditions of the use of 
expressive rationality in the political public sphere.  
   
III. 
This last section aims to raise some reflections on possible outcomes of this study, especially 
on what  concerns the remaining aspects  of the fascination  of authority in  aesthetical  and 
expressive  discourses,  how  they  relate  to  moral  and  legal  discourses  and  how  they  can 
contribute to a better understanding of modern law.  
The  underlying  objective  is  to  contribute  to  the  avoidance  of  new  attempts  of 
aesthetization of politics, which in extreme cases can evolve to populism or fascist practices, 
and at the same time to suggest how aesthetic and expressive communications can collaborate 
with practical discourse to strengthen the solidarity of the citizens of the state. It is only with a 
similar endeavor that communicative action can be used in all its extent without threatening 
its social integration function with its own elements. 
As became clear in the first two sections, the fascinating character of archaic authority 
highlighted  by  Habermas  has  connections  with  religion,  aesthetics  and  also  expressive 
practices that lead to individuation, or at least to the bondage of personality with collectivity 
in more symbolically integrated societies. 
 
1. From the fascination to the aesthetics of authority 
In terms of the aesthetic character of the fascination of authority as what remains from the 
religious  and  archaic  symbolic  orders,  this  “linguistification”  process  -  in  this  case  an 
“aesthetization” of authority – can be analyzed in an analogy with the loss of the aura of the 
                                                           
22 In a similar approach, but used to analyze experiences of recognition, see Honneth, Das Ich im Wir. Berlin: 
Suhrkamp, 2010; Id. Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory. 2007. 17 
work of art by its reproducibility, as discussed by Benjamin in the seminal study published in 
1937
23.  
In this picture, it is interesting to notice that if for Habermas the aesthetic “shocks” of 
cinema, which provoke ambivalent feelings similar to those of the fascination of authority 
(BFN, 24), could lead to a possible emancipatory use of reproduced art (Habermas, 1975:297-
332; Duvenage, 2003:24), the moment of possible emancipation through aesthetics would be 
as well involved by ambivalent feelings or this sort.  
Fear and reverence, dread and attraction, disgust and seduction could hence be seen as 
the  implicit  and  “lost  aesthetic  chores”  –  with  emancipatory  potentials  -  of  critique  and 
persuasion,  misunderstanding  and  convincement  in  practical  discourse,  and  falseness  and 
truth  in  assertoric  sentences.  To  understand  these  relations  is  to  expand  the  scope  of 
communicative action not only to the possibilities of its “breakdown” by its aesthetic features, 
but also to understand that consensus through language has at the same time an aesthetic 
element of attraction that can strengthen the social bonds of communicative action. 
With the loss of authority’s “aura”, its substitution for consensus through language would 
then have to consider itself as an incomplete process. In this sense, the passage from the 
fascination of authority to the aesthetics of authority could be continued by the analogy with 
Benjamin’s reflections. With this analogy, one can consider that although the “authenticity” 
of the authority of consensus would not be measured anymore by its  “cult value”, or its 
manifestation  in  ritualized  practices,  the  bonding  power  of  these  practices  would  still  be 
somehow  maintained  in  its  “exhibition  value”  (Benjamin,  1975:16-19),  such  as  in  the 
reproducible works of art.    
In other words, the way authority becomes “visible”, or the form that it is publicized has 
extreme influence on the manifestation of the strong bonding potential that it still carries from 
archaic and traditional authority. If then, the “exhibition value” of legal authority could be 
read as a “publicity value”, the mere possible “free access” to this publicization in official 
newspapers cannot be considered alone as “good” or sufficient publicization, for example. 
The  same  can  be  said  about  parliament  sessions  and  court  judgments:  the  non-
problematization  of  how  they  publicize  law  in  these  communicative  spaces  leaves  this 
                                                           
23 As Benjamin states in a footnote of the thesis IV of “The Work of Art...”, “As the cult value of image 
secularizes, the substratum that makes it a reality, which is given only once, becomes ever more indeterminate. 
The spectator inclines more every time to substitute the unity of the phenomena in the cult image for the 
empirical unity of the artist and his creative activity. The substitution is, without a doubt, never integral; the 
notion of authenticity never ceases to refer to something more than the simple guarantee of originality. (…) 
Despite all this, the role of the concept of authenticity in the field of art is ambiguous; with the secularization of 
the latter, authenticity becomes the substitute of the cult value.” (Benjamin, 1975:16. Free translation from 
Brazilian version). 18 
important aspect of authority on one side to the aseptic and unattractive legal form, and on the 
other to the theatrical character of judgments by popular jury.
24 
Along with this possible analogy with Benjamin’s “The Work of Art…”, several authors 
also read with distinct views the aesthetics of authority through Habermasian concepts of 
reason and communication. 
The interesting work of Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi called Fascist Spectacle (1997) on 
the aesthetics of Italian Fascism, is a good example of how it is possible to utilize a dialogue 
between Benjaminian  aesthetics  and Habermasian pragmatic  conception of intersubjective 
communication to understand relations between aesthetics and politics. In the introduction to 
the work, Falasca-Zamponi cites the pioneering studies of Emilio Gentile and George Mosse 
on  the  theme,  which  examined  the  aesthetics  of  the  Nazi  regime  as  a  “sacralization  of 
politics”. Still, she argues along with Benjamin that fascism should be explained as well as an 
aesthetization of politics (Falsca-Zamponi, 1997:4-5). 
In  a  similar  approach,  but  also  directed  to  psychology,  art  and  anthropology,  Susan 
Sontag in “Fascinating Fascism” (1975:15) deals with the fascination of Nazi aesthetics as a 
mixture of a history forged by propaganda with the cultic, bodily and symbolic aspects of an 
ideology that involves a “contention of impulses” such as those of fascination. According to 
Sontag, it is by controlling these drives, and at the same time influencing pornographic and 
sadomasoquist  culture  that  Nazi-fascist  aesthetics  attracted  (and  still  attracts)  people  who 
would not even be tolerated by the Nazis themselves, like those with homo-affective sexual 
preference. 
In a more specific critical theory approach, the work of Albrecht Wellmer develops a 
critique of Habermasian communicative rationality with Adornian concepts of rationality and 
aesthetics. In Endgames (1998), for example, Wellmer dedicates three important essays to the 
theme, and when discussing Adorno’s conception of the “sublime” in modern art, finds in it 
the same ambivalences felt in the fascination of sacred authority as described by Durkheim 
through Habermas: 
 
                                                           
24 In the case of popular juries, the interesting work of Ana Lúcia Pastore (2001) shows how the remaining 
fascinating power of authority is actualized in modern law, as has weak possibilities of rational critique: 
“Because the criminal justice system and, in its interior, the Jury, are systems of Power, they produce effects that 
are compared to the illusions created by theater, once the art of governing and scenic art are inseparable. During 
the trials, judge, prosecutor, defender and jury divide the position of ‘princes’. While the first reigns sovereign 
and apparently neutral, the second strongly accuses, the third protects and the rest decide, in meditative silence. 
Like a god that parts in four and because of that grows stronger, the scene of judging dramas about life and death 
has as one of its most striking results the sacralization of the institution ‘Justice’ and reinforces the social 
etiquette and aesthetics” (Schritzmeyer, A. L. P, 2001:2. Free translation from Brazilian version). 19 
“From  an  energetic  point  of  view  the  sublime  appears  as  shocking,  shattering,  moving, 
overpowering. If one understands the moment of aesthetic experience as one of a condensed 
presence,  through  which  the  temporal  continuum  of  ordinary  experience  is  suspended,  the 
experience of the sublime may be characterized by an additional element of violence, a violence 
that bursts into the interior space of aesthetic distance, shaking up, dislodging or disquieting the 
subject,  generating  a  tremor,  a  vertigo,  loosening  the  confines  of  the  experiencing  ego.” 
(Wellmer, 1998:163). 
 
In  a  dynamic  point  of  view,  however,  Wellmer  sees  Adorno’s  sublime  in  art  as  a 
“spiritualization  of  art”,  and  thus  as  an  emancipatory  experience,  for  it  enables  a  “‘self-
consciousness  of  spirit’”.  This  opens  venue  for  Wellmer  to  discuss  a  possible  theory  of 
intersubjective  communication  in  Adorno’s  aesthetics,  which  would  lead  to  a  more 
propositional  and  post-traditional  conception  of  aesthetics,  in  the  sense  of  loosening  and 
opening  communicative  rationality  to  the  experience  of  the  “heterogeneous”,  the 
“meaningless” and the “unspeakable" (Id. 1998:66-67). 
In  a  similar  direction,  Bittar  (2010)  deals  with  the  category  of  mimesis  in  Adorno’s 
aesthetics in an effort to understand its connection to authority and practical discourse. With 
aid on Honneth’s reception of the concept in “A Physiognomy of the Capitalist Form of Life: 
A  Sketch  of  Adorno’s  Social  Theory”  (Honneth,  2005),  and  with  Aristotle’s  substantial 
conception of ethics, Bittar relates the validity of the mimetic core of moral authority to an 
attitude that, for its virtue, and thus beauty, is due to imitation and repetition. The attraction 
and bond exerted by the norm on the subjects came from the virtues attributed to the actions 
that  were  norm-conforming.  These  actions  should  thus  be  intersubjectively  maintained  as 
tradition. 
Duvenage also discusses the concept of mimesis in his Habermas and Aesthetics (2003), 
in order to suggest the limits and the new possibilities of communicative reason when facing 
the  problem  of  aesthetic  rationality.  This  insight  is  taken  from  Habermas’  reading  of 
Benjamin’s incipient attempt at a “systematic theory of language” (Duvenage, 2003:22-27). 
On  the  end  of  the  book,  however,  Duvenage  also  suggests  possible  openings  of 
communicative reason to aesthetics by the latter’s world-disclosing function and its relation to 
truth claims, in a more Heideggerian oriented debate (Id.op.cit:120-141).  
The relation of this “other voice” (and no longer “the other side”) of rationality with 
moral and practical problems would not only be present in the importance that images and 
testimonies have in deliberative will formations and in judicial cases, but also because the 
expressions of the individual’s existential self-understanding and affective-emotional identity 20 
constitute part of the core of human dignity in post-traditional societies (Id.op.cit, pp. 137-
141)
25.  
This last example  highlights the importance of distinguishing between aesthetic and 
expressive  rationalities,  which  are  normally  considered  synonyms,  as  one  of  the  three 
differentiations of modern rationality in Habermas’ works. This is so because the reflections 
on the aesthetics of authority seem to reach only to a point of enabling one to grasp the 
contradictory and tense remaining elements of fascination that still influence implicitly the 
legitimacy of the authority and law.
26 As already seen in the last topic, however, the only way 
to understand it “operatively” is perhaps in the discussions and problematizations over how 
authority exhibits and should exhibit, or communicate itself to its publics. 
Therefore, it is on the concept of expressive rationality that this study will concentrate its 
last effort to elaborate on what would be left of the fascination of authority in the modern 
understanding of law. 
 
2. From the fascination to the expressive character of authority 
When decoupling the expressive from the aesthetic conception of reason within Habermas’ 
communicative rationality, artistic manifestations are substituted by expressions of emotions, 
confessions  and  testimonies  etc.  With  this  distinction,  it  is  possible  to  highlight  the 
importance  of  this  type  of  communication  for  a  renewal  of  the  possibilities  of  practical 
reason,  a  renewal  which  Habermas  seems  to  be  seeking  for  his  theory  of  law  when 
incorporating categories from Honneth’s theory of recognition
27  
Instead  of  focusing  on  the  sincerity,  “need-oriented”  and  individualistic  claims  of 
expressive rationality, like Habermas works in TCA (Habermas, 1984-II:62-76; Id, 1984-I: 
                                                           
25 This reflection has aid on Seyla Benhabib’s “extension” of the concept of aesthetic-expressive discourse”, in 
Benhabib, S. “The utopian dimension in communicative ethics”. In. D. Ingram and J. Simon-Ingram, (eds). 
Critical Theory: The Essential Readings, 1990: “‘the ego becomes an I only in a community of other selves who 
are also I’s. Yet every act of self-reference expresses, at the same time, the uniqueness and difference of this I 
from all others’. In formulating this view, Benhabib brings in aesthetic-expressive discourses, because modernity 
institutionalizes the discursive evaluation not only of moral and political issues, according to her, but also of 
aesthetic and expressive subjectivity (…) Consequently, the generalized other is therefore just as essential , 
according to Benhabib, as acknowledgement of the specificity of the concrete other” (Duvenage, 2003:140). 
26 This is also the first impression left by the important work by Derrida The Force of Law. The “Mystical 
Foundations of Authority”, which is cited by Habermas as “reductionist” aesthetic approach to law that he 
wanted to avoid in Between Facts and Norms (Habermas, 1996:xli). The element of mysticism present in law is 
analyzed by Derrida only in semantic levels, unraveling an important element of legal critique by the 
identification of non-logical (and also violent) elements present in law’s authority (Derrida, 2002:240). The 
suggested idea of the “visibility of law” as a pragmatic aesthetic claim is however not faced by Derrida, and 
therefore, his analysis remains only as an element of dislocation and critique of law, and not as a more normative 
concept of the aesthetical core of legal authority which we have attempted to sketch here. We acknowledge, 
however, that a more precise comparison between this study and Derrida’s recognized essay demands further 
research. 
27 See Habermas, 2007:279-347. See also section I of this study.   21 
90-101), a more public conception of expressive utterances, like that which Duvenage depicts 
from Benhabib (Duvenage, 2003:140-141), would then form with aesthetic claims a “social 
space of reasons” that can be seen as an “expressive-aesthetic public sphere”. It is in this 
sphere that not only artistic and cultural contents are manifested, but also where the actors 
make self-representations of themselves, publicize their life stories and personal feelings. In 
these  cases,  public  expressions  of  sentiments  of  injustice  or  misrecognition  can  enable 
processes  of  individuation  through  socialization,  for  they  are  connected  to  a  possible 
“experience of the other” as radical as the Hegelian notion of experiencing the ego as the 
identity between the universal and the particular.
28  
Therefore, expressions of the most authentic and sincere subjectivity of the individual, or 
the cultural identity of a collectivity that are publicized in this dimension of the political 
public sphere, can maybe generate an intersubjective bond to authority that derives from a 
kind of “negative solidarity”
29 that emerges when one sympathizes and has compassion for 
the suffering of the other.  
In other words, the respect for a moral or legal principle is stimulated affectively when an 
individual identifies with the other’s experience of their violation. The intersubjectivity that is 
formed by this identification comes from the shared interpretations of justice which underlie 
and give meaning to the individual’s negative experiences of injustice.  
Some of the dangers that surround the formation process of this negative solidarity are 
already  faced  by  Honneth  in  the  text  “Anerkennung  als  Ideologie”  (“Recognition  as 
Ideology”, 2010:103-130), where the difficulties of raising criteria to distinguish a “moral” 
from an “ideological” (or “power-oriented”) recognition are discussed. In this complex sphere 
where  material  feelings  of  recognition  or  misrecognition  are  expressed  and  evaluated  by 
moral  discourse,  the  negative  solidarity  that  emerges  can  be  as  well  manipulated  by  a 
“heteronymous” construction of biographies, narratives and images of victims in the mass 
media, for example. In other words, the identification with the other can still be involved by 
the seducing aspects of fascination that remain within expressive discourses as well, such as 
in populist adhesion to certain policies or leaders, fundamentalist beliefs and practices or 
fanaticisms.
30 
                                                           
28 For this Hegelian conception, which influenced the foundation of Habermas’ theory, see Habermas, 2006:20. 
29 I thank Professor Klaus Günther for suggesting in our discussions on this study the term “negative solidarity” 
as the last source of expressive communication which can enhance the solidarity of the citizens toward a critical 
legitimation of law.  
30 As Honneth highlights in the mentioned texts, the absence of empirical studies on the theme also makes it 
difficult to prove in the praxis of recognition the distinction between morals and power (Honneth, 2010: 108). 
This problem is being faced by a research project coordinated by Klaus Günther in the Institute for Social 
Research of the University of Frankfurt, intitled “Law, Struggle for Recognition as Victim”. For a publication of 22 
Still, it is through this negative solidarity that expressive communication stimulates the 
publicization  and  consensus  forming  attitudes  towards  practical  problems,  unraveling  this 
“lost source” of a possible solidarity of the citizens  that could strengthen communicative 
approaches to the legitimacy of law.  
Only when one problematizes the remaining aspects of the fascination of authority still 
present  in  law  and  in  public  spheres,  this  solidarity  potential  can  escape  the  mist  of  a 
supposed “inevitable ideology” and become a legitimate source of communicative power.  
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